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This paper introduces the meaning, trend and methodologies of stock price 
manipulation and conducts three event studies, using daily transaction data from 
the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and Korea Securities Dealers’ Automated 
Quotation (KOSDAQ). Having introduced the event study method, three 
companies - Willbes, Dongjak Cable and Communications, and Littauer 
Technologies - were tested by the method to see any symptom of stock price 
manipulation. This paper also tries to call people’s attention to the distinction of 
the normal returns of Acquisition and Development stocks from any returns made 
by manipulative efforts.  
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Abstract 
This paper introduces the meaning, trend and methodologies of stock price 
manipulation and conducts three event studies, using daily transaction data from 
the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and Korea Securities Dealers’ Automated 
Quotation (KOSDAQ).  Having introduced the event study method, three 
companies - Willbes, Dongjak Cable and Communications, and Littauer 
Technologies - were tested by the method to see any symptom of stock price 
manipulation.  This paper also tries to call people’s attention to the distinction of 
the normal returns of Acquisition and Development stocks from any returns made 
by manipulative efforts. 
 
Market size and size of illegal securities transaction moves together.  As the trading 
volume of the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and the Korea Dealers’ Automated 
 2 
Quotation (KOSDAQ) has increased, illegal securities transaction followed suit.  As 
the figures in <tableⅠ> shows, there is a positive relationship between trading volume 
and illegal trading practices.  Since 1999, with the overall improvement of market 
condition and lively investment activities in both the KSE and the KOSDAQ markets, 
those illegal securities transaction woke up from the hibernation as well. 
Here, one can raise a question.  Why was there only a relatively small increase in 
these illegal practices in 1999, compared to the four-fold increase in daily trading 
volume?  Are those practices decreasing?  The seemingly decreasing trend in those 
practices may imply that the market riggers are either too dexterous or too clever to be 
caught.1  
Before the prevalence of the Internet, the major way of doing illegal securities 
transaction was to exploit information asymmetry.  The main actors were insiders of 
listed companies who had inside information, not opened to the public.  The other 
main actors were people who received inside information under a certain obligation.  
Those people broke the obligation which prohibits misappropriation of the information 
and exploited illegal profits.  Such superior piece of information power enabled these 
                                                
1 The major reason of the seemingly decreasing trend is market riggers’ cleverness – they reduced the 
possibility of being detected by moving to the KOSDAQ market where market surveillance is relatively 
poor. And, there exist barriers to investigation on institutional and foreign investors. With it, financial 
authorities have difficulty in finding illegal securities transaction of those investors. Moreover, the 
financial authorities’ insufficient capability to eradicate the market disturbing power made conducive 
environment for manipulators.  
 3 
insiders to exploit extraordinary benefit over ordinary investors.  However, those 
transactions had a defect, possibility of trace, due to their attribute of requiring physical 
contacts of seller and buyer, and leaving documented or recorded evidences.  However 
the spread of the Internet has brought a great increase in numbers of investors as traders 
do not need to appear on the exchange spot and, at the same time, the cost and 
procedure of buying and selling stocks have become cheaper and faster.  At the same  
time, the Internet provided manipulators enormous chances in on- line spaces in the form 
of chat room or on- line bulletin boards.  Being under vast information on the web 
enabled manipulators to hide themselves from on-line detectives.  Also, internet 
providers do not store information under their control for a long time because it is costly 
and inefficient.  With the characteristics, on- line manipulation records hardly can be 
traced.  As a result, the Internet has made a friendly environment for the illega l 
securities transaction.  
With the quantitative increase in the trading volume and the qualitative 
improvement in dexterity of the illegal securities transaction skills, the precensorship of 
those illegal transactions has become next to impossible.  Besides the shortage of 
human resource to detect on- line manipulations, the major reason enabling those 
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manners is current computer system’s poor functioning. 2   Therefore, event study 
method – as an ex post study- is widely adopted in testing the existence of those illegal 
securities transaction.  Even courts use event study in estimation of illegal securities 
transaction’s existence.3  
Willbes, Dongjak Cable & Communications (DCC), and Littauer Technologies are 
the three companies I focus in this paper.  Those companies had and have been under 
suspicion of stock price manipulation. 4  These three corporations are listed in different 
markets – Willbes in the KSE, and the other two in the KOSDAQ - and they were 
conducted by different groups of investors – insiders and institutional investors.  Also, 
the methods, the manipulators used in those three cases, were diverse – dissemination of 
false information, immoral behavior and illegal allurement using information 
asymmetry.  I chose the three different stock price manipulation cases to find out 
whether they show similarity in spite of their different attributes.  The three cases are 
                                                
2 October 1994, the KSE launched “Stock Watch System (SWAS)” which detects unusual stock price 
movement. In addition, “Computer-assisted Surveillance System (CASS)” is also operating from January 
1995. However, the precise operations of the two systems are not disclosed to public, and some 
researches suggest possible errors of the systems. See Kim & Jang, 2000, “An inquiry into the function 
and role of stock price surveillance”, Symposium in the Korean Securities Association: 243-266. 
3 For the first time in Korea, on December 5, 2000 a court ordered a manipulator to indemnify plaintiffs 
(deceived investors) for the half of losses he inflicted. In the loss-estimation process, the court used a 
method of subtracting normal price from manipulated price following the American practices. However, 
the normal price was estimated by selecting the highest price of the securities for the last three years 
instead of using a market model. Thus, there might be some gap between the normal price obtained by a 
market model and used in the decision. 
4 As of May 2001, the Willbes case is the only one terminated by a court among the three cases. The 
court wrapped up the case by ordering the company to pay fine and by having manipulator’s indictment 
suspended. The other two cases are still under investigations. 
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about relatively small and medium size firms in which people are less interested.  
According to the information asymmetry literature, small and medium firms are 
susceptible to the illegal transactions such as stock price manipulation since their total 
amounts of equity are small and, consequently, easy to manipulate the stock prices.  
Thus riggers choose small and medium size firms so as to stir the market with less effort. 
This study tries to find out any distinction or similarity in the degree of 
manipulation by looking at the price changes of the three companies of interest. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Part I and II explains stock price 
manipulation and covers event study methodologies.  Section III introduces results of 
the event studies.  Section IV concludes.  
 
I. Stock Price Manipulation 
Stock price manipulation refers to all sorts of actions, which try to manipulate price 
through artificial pressures on supply and demand of a specific stock.  It is subject to 
penalty under the criminal and the civil law in Korea due to its negative effect of 
damaging investors’ confidence on the market. 
The Securities Exchange Law in Korea specifies insiders’ trading and stock price 
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manipulation as the twin axis of illegal transactions. 5   The two kinds of illegal 
securities transactions are considered to destroy the market’s price-setting function and 
to inflict abnormal losses to investors by hindering investors’ reasonable decision 
making.  For the eradication of the two main illegal transactions, the law adopts 
‘control on public disclosure’ and ‘control on illegal transactions’, respectively.  The 
control on public disclosure is to alleviate information asymmetry problem between 
insiders and outside investors by obligating companies to disclose their information in 
the securities market.  The control on illegal transactions is to secure the confidence of 
investors by prohibiting deceptive trades which hamper the price-setting function of the 
market and which abnormally inflict losses to investors.  
Even with those legal preventions, it is not an easy work to regulate the stock price 
manipulation because discrimination of legal transactions from illegal ones is tricky 
since every security transaction has an impact on the stock price in the securities market.  
Also, stock price manipulation temporarily leads to increase in trading volume and, as a 
result, to increase in stock price when the market is not liquid enough.  Thus, 
punishment of the manipulation is not a clear-cut issue when there exists a need to 
                                                
5 Clause 188-2 of Securities Exchange Law (revised in February 1999) specifies the range of insider and 
inside information & responsibilities of compensation for damage. Clause 188-4 (revised in January 
1997) and 188-5 (revised in February 1999) of the same Law specify the penal responsibilities and civil 
liabilities of market manipulations. 
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activate the market but the securities market is still sluggish.  
The stock price manipulation has another attribute that exploits extraordinary 
benefits from the nature of securities trading business.  Those illegal transactions 
cannot take place without any approval or cooperation of the employees of a securities 
company because of the fact that the securities companies are in the best position of 
detecting the illegal securities transactions since all the stock trading orders are 
brokeraged though them.  Nevertheless, the securities companies might be giving tacit 
consent to the unfair trade because they are highly dependent upon brokerage 
commission from customers as their major source of earnings.  
Lately, manipulation opportunities expanded with the spread of cyber and day 
trading that were enabled by the Internet.  With the increase in cyber and day trading 
as shown in the <table Ⅱ> and <table Ⅲ>, attempts to rig the market have increased.  
The implication of these attempts is that manipulators are now in much easier position 
to disturb the market while in a much harder position to be detected.  The manipulators, 
using anonyms, can deceive millions of other investors in a day thanks to the net. 
Relatively light punishment for manipulation is also devoting to the increase of the 
attempts.  As already mentioned, manipulation case hardly detected and penalized.  
Also, the penalty for manipulations is, at best, paying fine.  That is, if a manipulator 
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gets caught out of a couple of manipulations and pays fine, he/she would still have some 
profits from the undetected manipulations.  These manners would leave a room for 
future manipulative attempts.  
Based on their types, market manipulation can be classified into four categories – 
disguised trade, actual trade, manifestation, fixation and stabilization.  The followings 
are the detailed definitions and their respective methods.  
 
1. Disguised Trade (Painting the Tape) 
A disguised trade refers to a transaction that has a purpose of inducing investors to a 
misconception without any intention for transfer of ownership.  Otherwise, people are 
made to think that the trading volume is increasing or the price is rising by disguised 
trades.   
Under this category there are two sub-categories.  First type is an improper 
matched order.  An improper matched order is a securities transaction at the same time 
with the same price and quality following collusion.  All trades with in-advance 
promise are not necessarily stock price manipulation since it can be used to transfer 
rights.  However, repeated reverse trading orders can reap the effect of inflating the 
trading volume at a low cost, and once other investors begin to buy the stock and, 
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consequently, the stock price begin to rise, the riggers make profit by later selling the 
stocks they own.  
Second type is a wash sale.  One may call it ‘a single-handed improper matched 
order’.  This type of transaction is seemingly the same with an ordinary transaction 
except for the absence of transfer of ownership.  It has the same effect with an 
improper matched order in inflating the trading volume and market price.  It is the case 
at which the person who place a buy-order and the person who place a sell-order of the 
stocks is the same person.  Otherwise, it is the case when a person, after a transaction, 
eliminates the effect of the transfer of right through a reverse trade.  
An investor who asks those trading orders or an employee of a securities firm who 
accepts those orders can be the target of legal penalty under the Korean Securities 
Exchange Law. 6  The basis of the punishment is that not only the trade itself but also 
the orders that are not materialized can affect the reasonable decision making of 
investors. 
 
2. Actual Trade 
An actual transaction having the intention of leading investors to a misconception is 
                                                
6 Article 1 of Clause 188-4 Securities Exchange Law  
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also prohibited by the Korean Securities Exchange Law.  The law specifies an actual 
trade by which traders can mistakenly think trading volume is increasing or market 
price is rising is another category of stock price manipulation.  It is the foundation of 
the stipulation that a bulk order has a possibility of causing disequilibria of supply and 
demand in the securities market, as well as having a leverage on the price by hinting 
people an existence of a good-news or bad-news.  
However, an extensive order, of course, affects the price of a stock.  Thus, the 
manipulative intention using an actual trade requires a sophisticated examination to be 
uncovered.  Therefore, in many countries, analogous factors are used in estimation of 
the intention of misconception.  Factor used for the estimation in the United States is 
pecuniary interest of a manipulator.  Japan considers factors such as subsistence of 
economic rationality, presumable motive, modality, and pre- & post-circumstances of a 
transaction.  Korea estimates the intention of misconception by examining whether an 
extraordinary turbulence in the price was generated, whether the trade is natural under 
trading sense, and whether the trade has a chance to blur the reasonable decision making 
of investors.  Once a transaction lacks the economic rationality, it is regarded as an 
actual trade, and, consequently become an object of punishment.7  
                                                
7 Item 1 of Article 2 of Clause 188-4 Securities Exchange Law 
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3. Manifestation 
Manifestation is the third category of stock price manipulation using notification.  It 
refers those actions deceiving investors by spreading or displaying fallacy with the 
intention of misconception.  First type of manifestation is dissemination of 
manipulation.  Disseminators circulate rumors that stock price would be changed by a 
manipulation which is not existing.  Other investors who received the rumors 
obviously sell or buy to avoid future losses.  Then, the manipulator would gain profits 
when other investors are in the chaotic state.  
Second type is false disclosure.  It is the behavior that an entity deliberately 
makes up a story, which can critically affect the stock price owned by the entity, about 
dividend payment and capital increase by public offering.  Gaining profits by selling 
the shares after the false notification with the intention of misconception is what is 
necessary to penalize the manipulator.8  
 
4. Fixations and Stabilization 
The Korean Securities Exchange Law also inhibits selling and buying stocks, as well as 
                                                
8 Item 2, 3 of Article 2 of Clause 188-4 Securities Exchange Law 
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asking and accepting orders which are placed for the purpose of fixation or stabilization 
of stock price.  Fixation – effort of maintaining current price – has a difference from 
general manipulations in its passive nature.  However, it is a manipulative act since it 
hinders the markets’ price-setting function.  
It has two exceptions.  The law tolerates narrowly defined stabilization and 
market fostering even though they fall apparently within the purview of actual trades.   
The basis of the permission can be found in the two exceptions’ alleviative function on 
the market percussion raised by share offerings.  The narrowly defined stabilization 
implies that action of an undertaker of new shares intervenes the market and stabilizes 
the price of already-offered shares to promote the new share offerings.  It is market 
fostering that controlling the demand and supply for the newly offered shares for some 
time period after the listing.  It is to prevent a decline in the price of the offered stock 
following the increase in the quantity of the stock.9 
 
Beside those four types of manipulation, the Securities Exchange Law has a clause 
prohibits deceptive transactions in general.  Even if the clause is abstract, the clause 
which gives a strong message that it is against any kind of practices which leads 
                                                
9 Article 1 of Clause 83-8 Securities Exchange Law 
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ordinary investors to engage in irrational decision making or which hampers the market 
from being efficient.10 
 
Ⅱ. Event Study Methodologies 
Everything in this world has reasons of origination as well as effects on others.  In 
economy, events such as announcement of new information, increase in capital through 
public offering, merger and acquisition, etc., have effects on other variables in the 
economy – most importantly on the value of a firm.  In a scholastic world, the effect of 
these economic events can be measured by an event study method: the statistics-based 
research method using past data on equity price.  It is the strong point of an event 
study that allows researchers to measure the effect of an economic event with ease and 
objectivity.  And also it enables researchers to distinguish whether the impact is 
reasonable or artificially fabricated.  Thus, this merit made people in legal field and 
economics use event study method to assess and disgorge ill-gotten money, and to 
measure the impact on the value of a firm caused by an event.  When an early 
detection system does not function well, event study method can be the best ex post tool 
                                                
10 According to a report “Investigating and Prosecuting the Market Manipulation”, Technical Committee 
of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (ISOCO), 2000, the member countries of 
Technical Committee Working Group on Enforcement and the Exchange of Information (TCWG-4) 
regard advancing the bid, pumping and dumping, marking the close, and squeeze as the other 
manipulative methods. 
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detecting and gauging effect of stock price manipulation with.  
Since the first publication by Dolley (1933), continuing developments by Myers 
and Bakay (1948), Baker (1956, 1957, 1958), and Ashley (1962) have settled event 
study methodology as the form of modern research method.  Further modifications by 
scholars such as Ball and Brown (1968), Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) shaped 
event study into an ingenious tool of study broadly used now.11 
Event study is based on the efficient market hypothesis stating that stock price 
reflects all publicly available information. 12  Since the hypothesis has an assumption of 
reasonable behavior of investors, event study also assumes that investors would 
reasonably react to a new arrival of information.  Under the assumption, distinguishing 
normal profit or return from abnormal one is possible through estimation of normal 
profit assuming absence of the specific event and comparison of it with the actual one.  
Among many detailed steps, the major steps include defining event and estimation 
windows, finding normal and abnormal returns, and testing for the significance of 
abnormal return.  
 
1. Estimation and Event Windows 
                                                
11 See Campbell, Lo & Mackinlay, 1996, “The Econometrics of Financial Markets” 
12 Cone & Laurence, 1994, How Accurate are Estimates of Aggregate Damages in Securities Fraud 
Cases?, The Business Lawyer,  Vol. 49 
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After identifying an event, defining an event window and an estimation window are the 
first steps in any event study.  Event window includes the period during which an event 
is thought to have affected the value of a firm concerned.  The period is a core part in 
an event study since, without any clear definition of an event window,  an event study 
tends to lose its direction and end up giving wrong implications.  
The length of an event window (L2) depends on the characteristic of the event 
being studied.  Normally a fraud case in a stock market requires a sufficient period to 
be studied as they leave aftershocks in the market.  The longer the event window, 
however, the more difficult it will be for researchers to discriminate the effect of the 
targeted event from that of other events.  
Estimation window is the period during which a normal relationship is estimated 
between a specific firm’s stock return and the market return.  Besides the market return 
such as KOSPI, in the regression model, one may include other indices’ returns as 
independent variables such as return from an industry index or return from a 
comparable company.  However, the market model is most widely used.  
Like the length of an event window, there exists a trade-off in determining the 
length of an estimation window (L1).  Barriers to the collection of sufficient trading 
data due to unavailability arising from occasion such as short operating history may 
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hamper representing the normal relationship with accuracy, while too long estimation 
window may dilute the relationship with the possible inclusion of other events.  
Some events may leave negative aftershocks for a long period of time after the 
outburst of the event.  Study on the post-event period would capture the residual.13  
The following figure shows the three windows graphically. 
Time Line of Windows 
 
 
 
 
 
In the figure above, t denotes the day on which an event took place, and Tn denotes 
the first day and last day of each window.  In this paper, for the simplicity, I treat event 
and post-event windows together as an event window.  Thus, the length of an 
estimation window (L1) is the period between T0 and T1, and the length of an event 
                                                
13 The purpose of a manipulation is to realize an abnormal return. Ordinary procedure of a manipulation 
begins with an artificial increase of a stock price through inflating trading volume. People with inferior 
information may think the price hike is reasonable and may want to join the investors group expecting 
further price increase. At peak, manipulators would sell their own shares. Then, the result of selling is 
usually nose-diving stock price and huge losses to the people joined the group later. In this frame, an 
event window covers the period up to the peak in order to measure the abnormal return the manipulators 
got and a post-event window covers the later period in order to measure the amount of damage the 
investors received. 
To 
Estimation 
Window 
Event 
Window 
Post-event 
Window 
t T1 T2 T3 
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window (L2) is the period between T1 and T3. 
 
2. Abnormal returns 
Having defined an estimation window and an event window, researchers calculate 
normal and abnormal returns of a specific stock.  Beforehand, researchers opt some 
indices for the analysis under consideration of barriers arouse in data gathering process.  
Selection of criteria, although highly subjective, needs some considerations. 14  
Through ordinary least square (OLS) ana lysis using past daily trading data during the 
estimation window period (L1), the normal relationship among the stock return and 
other criteria are obtained and are articulated in regression models: 
                            Rt = a + b  n Rmtn + e t                ------------------ (1)   
E [e t] = 0    Var [e t] = se2 
Rt and Rmt are the returns on the stock under question and the n indices from the market, 
respectively, on the trading date t.15   et is the disturbance term which cannot be 
                                                
14 Campbell, Lo & Mackinlay, 1996 “The Econometrics of Financial Markets” 
15 The returns on a stock are ‘adjusted returns’. That is, returns are adjusted for special events such as 
stock splits, dividends, and issuing of new shares. If Rt denotes nominal return on day t , Pt and Pt-1 
respectively denote prices on day t and t-1, their relationship can be shown as following: 
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For adjustment for a stock split, the following equation is used where K1 is the ratio of number of newly 
distributed shares to the number of outstanding shares: 
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explained by the market returns, and a, bn and et are parameters.  This model has the 
name of Multiple Factor Market Model since the parameters are derived from the 
relations among the return of the stock and the returns of market indices.16  In this step, 
researchers create many regression models using combinations of market indices. 
Among many candidate regression models sought through the regression analysis, the 
model with the highest adjusted R2 is chosen because of the fact that the higher R2, the 
greater reduction in the variance of the return.17  
Based on the regression model, researchers estimate normal return, the return that 
would have taken place in the absence of the event over the event window period (L2).  
Inputting returns of market indices into the regression model chosen does this procedure.  
As the definition implies, abnormal return is the excess return earned by the impact 
of the event over the normal return.  Thus, next job is to estimate the abnormal return 
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For a capital increase through issuing new shares where K2 denotes the ratio of the number of new shares 
issued to the number of stocks outstanding and A denotes the price of the newly issued share, the 
following equation is used. 
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16 Campbell, Lo & Mackinlay, 1996, “The Econometrics of Financial Markets”  “ …The Capital Asset 
Pricing Model was commonly used in event studies during the 1970s. During the last ten years, however, 
deviations from the CAPM have been discovered, and this casts doubts on the validity of the restrictions 
imposed by the CAPM on the market model. Since these restrictions can be relaxed at little cost by using 
the market model, the use of the CAPM in event studies has almost ceased.”   
17 Campbell, Lo & Mackinlay, 1996, “The Econometrics of Financial Markets” 
 19 
by subtracting the estimated normal return from actual return of the stock.  
Equationwise the abnormal return on trading day t is expressed by the following. 
                          teˆ = Rt - taˆ - nbˆ Rmtn                     ------------------ (2) 
Under the null hypothesis that the event had no effect on the value of the stock of 
interest, the abnormal return ( teˆ ) follows a distribution with a mean of zero, thus 
unbiased. 
In order to find out the overall magnitude of the event’s impact, researchers 
aggregate the abnormal returns over the event window.  The usual method used in this 
step is to compute cumulative abnormal returns (CAR).  The CAR is a mere geometric 
summation of the abnormal returns during the period T1 and T3 having distributional 
mean of zero and a variance of s2(T1, T3) under the null hypothesis.  The following is 
the equation for CAR. 
CAR (T1, Tn) = 1)]1(()1)(1[( 21 -+++ nARARAR L   
                         = Õ
=
-+
n
i
iAR
1
1)1(                ------------------ (3) 
 
3. Test for the Significance of the Abnormal Returns 
Whether the event’s impact on the value of the firm’s stock was significant or not is 
tested through the significance test (usually the student’s t-test) on CAR.  As the daily 
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CAR has statistical significance, researchers are in the position where they can claim the 
value of the specific stock is certainly affected by the event and different from the 
normality.  The testing requires a process of transforming CAR into standard form 
(Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return: SCAR) by dividing CAR with its standard 
deviation: 
SCAR (T1, Tn)  =
),(
  ),(
1
1
n
n
TT
TTCAR
s
 
With the test statistic of t*(L1 -2; a /2) where (L1–2) and a are, respectively, the degree of 
freedom and the significance level of an event study, every daily SCAR is tested their 
statistical significance.  By doing so, the null hypothesis can be either accepted or 
rejected.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, the CAR during the event window period is 
said to have been affected by the event of interest.18 
For further inferences, researchers calculate normal and abnormal prices of the 
stock during the verified period of impact. Usually it is to disgorge or charge penalty on 
the abnormal gains of market riggers.  
 
Ⅲ. Actual Cases 
Among many stock price manipulation cases in Korea, I choose the three firms –
                                                
18 If the CAR of certain period is significant, researchers consider the stock price is affected by a 
manipulation even though each AR during the period is insignificant. 
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Willbes, Littauer Technologies, and Dongjak Cable and Communications (DCC).   
These cases are chosen to cover different sorts of manipulation types.19  
The data used here are daily trading data obtained from Korea Securities Research 
Institute (KSRI).  To estimate of the multi- factor model for each case, I utilized Korea 
Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI), KOSDAQ index and industrial indices as well 
as price records of others firms that are comparable to the firms of interest.  Since 
recent manipulation cases are picked, the time period covered in this paper is from year 
1997 to 2000.  The following three parts are allocated to three cases under question 
and some general inferences.  
 
1. Willbes 
Willbes is a knitwear producing company established in 1973 under the name of Kunja 
Industrial Co. Ltd.  In February 1997, it changed its name to the current one and 
enlarged the areas of business into venture capital and internet business through a 
couple of acquisitions of information technology, internet, and venture capital 
companies such as KTB network, Auction, MiraeNet and promising internet venture 
                                                
19 Willbes is listed in the KSE and the CEO of the company executed the manipulation. DCC is 
registered at KOSDAQ and was manipulated by employees of a securities company. Littauer 
Technologies is registered at KOSDAQ and thought to be the co-work of the CEO and institutional 
investors. 
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companies. 
On February 11th 1998, the company announced an innovative invention of 
cooling-can (they named it Wonder-can) using an epochal cooling catalyst.  According 
to the announcement, the can does not need any refrigerator or ice in order to be cooled 
- just by opening the can, the company claimed, people can enjoy cold beverages.  
With the announcement, investors got excited resulting in skyrocketing stock price from 
5000 to 6000 KRW in January to 34500 KRW at the end of February.  
The invention was amazing, however the problem was that the catalyst did not 
have any certification or approval of authority due to its harm to people, and that was 
the epicenter of manipulative suspicion.  Number of people who believed the 
announcement was cooked up to increase the stock price of Willbes increased.  
Consequently, Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) began to suspect the announcement 
to be a stock price manipulation case led by insiders.  
Thus, I set the event window for this case the period between February 11, 1998 
and March 12 of the same year (L2 = 26 trading days) considering the possible 
aftermath of the announcement until the date it turned out to be a gimmick.20  To 
estimate the normal relationship, the Willbes’ historical rate of return data were 
                                                
20 Another event study with longer event window (L2 = 115) gave a diluted effect of the announcement 
on the stock price without any improvement in the model.  
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regressed by returns of KOSPI, mid-sized corporations’ index, whole sellers’ index and 
Shinsung Corporation for 126 trading days (L1=126).21  I chose Shinsung Corporation 
since it is a comparable company in size (medium size) and the nature of business (a 
knit-wear producing company).   
Having identified the estimation and event windows, it was found that the best 
regression model, showing the highest adjusted R2, was the model with the three 
variables including KOSPI, mid-sized corporations’ index and Shinsung Corporation as 
independent variables.  The regression model is as follows; 
    RWillbes = 0.0136 – 1.7495 RKOSPI + 2.8341 RMid-sized – 0.2771 RShinsung       ----- (4) 
(0.0050)    (0.4441)       (0.4905)       (0.1219) 
Here, R stands for returns on each variable with its standard error in the parentheses.  
The results of other models are available in <Table Ⅳ>.  
The next step is to calculate the normal return and the abnormal return of the 
Willbes using the equation above.  This is nothing but inserting the actual movements 
of the three market indices during the event window into the model above, and 
subtracting the result from the actual return of Willbes.  
                                                
21 The estimation window for this specific case could vary since Willbes has a rich historical price 
database coming from its long history, consequently having no limitation on collecting data to compare 
with. After trying several regressions, I found out the model with shorter estimation window (L1=126) is 
better than the one with longer estimation period (L1=323) in explaining the movements of the Willbes 
stock return in the market. For example, the best model with the shorter window has an adjusted R2 of 
0.2964 while the best with longer one has that of 0.2290.  
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For the primary purpose of testing the manipulation, the abnormal returns were 
aggregated and changed into CARs, and then standardized into SCARs.  The test 
criterion for the Willbes case is t(124; 0.05/2) = 1.96, and compared with each t-value in 
<table V>.  According to the criterion, 21-day period between February 11 and March 
6, 1998 has t-values that are larger than the criterion. 22   This rejected the null 
hypothesis of ‘no manipulative impact on the stock’s performance’ at the five percent 
significance level, statistically supporting the assertion on the existence of manipulative 
actions.  Like the result of t-test, <figure I> suggested that the CAR of Willbes were 
positive during the period between February 11 and March 9, 1998.  
With the recognition of manipulation on the Willbes stock during the event 
window period, I calculated normal stock price movements and the stock’s return 
movements, and compared them with the actua l price movements and actual return 
movements in <figure Ⅱ>.  As the figure suggests, there is acknowledgeable  
difference between the actual and the normal movements.  Since the graphical 
difference was statistically proven, I was able to conclude this case as following: during 
the period February 11 to March 6, 1998, stock investors were manipulated by the false 
information on the unauthorized catalyst so that the existing shareholders including the 
                                                
22 Although the company announced the invention on February 11, 1998, its stock price went down on 
that day. Starting from the following day, however, the stock price launched a fifteen-day increase. 
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management might have a chance to gain abnormal returns.  
 
2.Dongjak Cable & Communications 
The second case is about the manipulation case led by the institutional investors in the 
KOSDAQ market.  DCC was a small cable television company in Seoul that provided 
local cable television services and cable relaying services.  Due to its monopolistic 
position in the region, DCC grew steadily with the population in the region.  In 
October 1999, a joint cable television company called Daeho Cable Communications 
and Network that provide nationwide cable services and Internet cable services acquired 
DCC.  Before the transformation, it was a negligible  company with a relatively small 
market capitalization.  The manipulation on the company began with the easiness of 
manipulation arising from the small size and unpopularity of the firm to the public.  
Though the name of this case is DCC stock price manipulation, the cable television 
company, as far as I know, has nothing to do with illegal transactions, and was a 
scapegoat with the price decrease following the scandal – the riggers of this case were 
institutional investors, Tong Yang Securities Co. Ltd.  
On November 30 1999, Tong Yang Securities sent a positive message to investors 
and recommended buying DCC stocks.  Investors who received the information from 
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investment information facilities such as stock trade magazines, bulletin boards on the 
Internet, believed it and began to buy the stock since it was an auspicious sign from a 
reliable securities firm.  As a result, the DCC stock price, which was 34,900 KRW on 
November 30th, rose up to 39,050 KRW on the next trading day.  However, on 
December 2nd, the securities firm began to sell huge amount of stocks it had owned, 
leading the stock price of DCC to fall.  On December 3rd, the stock price closed at 
31,400 KRW per share.  People filed protests against the immoral conduct.  Against 
these protests, the securities firm made an excuse regarding the extensive selling of the 
stocks with a comment that the selling was prompted by the sell orders from its clients.  
Many investors who thought they were cheated by the securities firm requested a 
scrutiny by the FSS.  
For the estimation of regression models, I selected the KOSDAQ index as a 
comparable index in finding the normal movement of the DCC stock in the market.  In 
addition, I included the Venture industry index and the Futures Cable TV into the 
estimation.  The choice of Venture industry index reflected the belief of ordinary 
investors that the DCC was a venture business having plans to enlarge its business 
sector into the Internet service provision.  And, the inclusion of the Futures Cable TV, 
like the Willbes case, came from the consideration of size (small sized local firm) and 
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the nature of business (cable television relaying service). 
Characteristically the event window for the DCC consists of two consecutive time 
periods because two manipulative actions were involved.  One was the first two-day 
period during which the securities firm recommended the investors to buy DCC stocks, 
and the other was the following nineteen-day period during which the securities firm 
sold its owned stocks.  Since these two actions had offsetting effects to the prices and 
returns of the stock, I decided to treat them separately.  In sum, the length of the event 
window was twenty-one days (L2=21). 
The possible estimation window for this case was sixty-two days and, some might 
raise doubt on the significance of the inferences extracted out of it.  The estimation 
from such a short period of time might have led me to a wrongful relationship, however, 
it was the best choice allowed since the DCC and the Futures Cable TV were registered 
at KOSDAQ for only a short period of time before the event.  Thus, for the purpose of 
the consistent comparison, I had no choice but to set the estimation window period from 
September 1 to November 29, 1999 which is a sixty-two-days period (L1=62).23  
Through the multi- factor market model, I estimated seven regression models, and 
                                                
23 To be consistent, one has to use the same length of time period for all the comparable sources of 
comparison. Though the other two comparing indices (KOSDAQ and Venture industry) had long enough 
trading records to use, the short history of the two  companies restricted the use of the rich information 
about the two indices from the past before their registration.  
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picked the one with the highest adjusted R2 from <table Ⅵ>.  The model is following. 
     RDCC = -0.0032 – 0.9905 RKOSDAQ + 1.0313 RVenture + 0.4637 RFCT          ----- (5) 
(0.0068)     (0.4803)       (0.3360)        (0.1216) 
As before, R  represents returns for each index and the companies, and the numbers in 
the parentheses are their standard errors.  One can find that the return of DCC is 
negatively correlated with the KOSDAQ index while moving together with the Venture 
industry index and the similar firm during the estimation period.  
With the relationship above, I estimated the DCC stock’s normal and abnormal 
returns.  As for the effect of recommendation, I accumulated the first two-day’s returns.  
As for the effect of selling, I accumulated the period from day three (December 2, 1999) 
to the end of the event window.  
As shown in <table Ⅶ>, the CARs show different signs.  Graphical expression in 
<figure Ⅲ> also shows the confrontation – positive CARs for the first two days 
followed by sharp drop to negative CARs.  The figure implies that the stock price of 
the DCC went up sharply as a result of the recommendation for the first two days, and 
then, nose-dived right after the selling orders of the securities company.  One can 
easily imagine the huge losses of innocent investors who purchased the DCC stock 
following the recommendation.  In the t-test result, the five-trading-day period 
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(December 1st ~ 5th) was found to be significant rejecting the null hypothesis, which 
says the CAR is different from zero, under five percent significance level.  Thus, Tong 
Yang Securities manipulated the stock price of DCC by making it increase through the 
recommendation, and by making it decrease through the intensive selling.  Though 
whether the securities firm purchased the DCC stock after the price fall was not confirm, 
the securities firm might have exploited abnormal gains through the two manipulations.  
The graphical result in <figure Ⅳ> shows the normal prices of DCC which had 
been obtained if manipulation had not taken place.  One can find the biggest gap 
between the normal and actual price on the second day of event window (December 1st), 
and the gap decreases due to the effects of the intensive selling.  
 
3.Littauer Technologies 
Littauer Technologies is an international holding and management company which 
invests, develops and manages a comprehensive network of business solutions 
companies in the Asia Pacific region.  Before an American corporation called Littauer 
Strategics acquired it in June 2000, it was a small manufacturing company which 
produced motors and dischargers for boilers.  
The stock price of the manufacturing company on January 26, 2000 was 2,000 
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KRW per share.  However, for the following a few months, its stock price went up 
beyond ordinary investors’ expectation, and reached at the pick of 362,000 KRW on 
May 18, 2000.  The surprised investors and stock market analysts tried to find out the 
momentum of the price hike.  However, those efforts revealed nothing except for a 
suspicion of manipulation on its notification about inflow of foreign capital.  Though 
Littauer Technologies acquired huge amount of foreign capital on July 21, 2000, people 
claimed it was to cheat ordinary investors since the money flowed out just in three hours. 
People also pointed the management as a rigger of the illegal transaction.  With the 
suspicion, the FSS of Korea asked prosecutors for investigation. 
To test the Littauer Technologies’ case, I set the period from January 27 to the end 
of year 2000 as the event window (L2=224).  Information about the inflow of foreign 
capital was released from February but the exact day on which the manipulation began 
was not clear.  So, I selected the day with the  lowest stock price before it began to rise 
as the beginning.  Likewise, when the manipulation was finished is also not clear.  So, 
I set the event window long enough to catch all the possible aftermath. 
The estimation window for this case starts from August 2, 2000.  The historical 
data of Littauer Technologies prior to this date is useless because Littauer Strategics 
acquired PowerTech, the Littauer Technologies’ former self, and named Littauer 
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Technologies in June 2000.  As already mentioned, after the acquisition the 
manufacturing company transformed into an investment holding company.  Under the 
name of Acquisition and Development (A&D)24, it has changed its business sector and 
outfits, and, at the same time, its stock price began to rise.  Consequently, the history 
of PowerTech was no longer useful in estimating normal movement of Littauer 
Technologies and the longest estimation window I could get was from August 2, 1999 
(L1=122). 
Like the case of DCC, Littauer Technologies is registered at the KOSDAQ market.  
This fact led me use the KOSDAQ index and Venture industry index in the estimation 
of the multi- factor market model.  The fact that it is an A&D stock also allowed me to 
use another A&D stock to compare – it was Barunson, a well-known A&D company. 25  
After a couple of trials to draw the best regression model, I got the following model and 
the result is in <table Ⅷ>: 
     RLittauer = 0.0022 – 0.6180 RKOSDAQ + 0.6276 RVenture + 0.3459 RBarunson   ----- (6) 
(0.0068)    (0.4837)       (0.3535)       (0.0841) 
The equation above revealed the similar movement of Littauer Technologies’ stock 
                                                
24 A&D refers to a managerial technique under which a company with ample fund acquires a firm with 
high level of technologies, develops and increases the value of the acquired firm. The Cisco Systems ’ 
case is a good example of successful A&D. 
25 Barunson was originally school and office supplies manufacturing company. Through an acquisition 
by an investment company, its business sector has been widened and its stock price began to rise like 
Littauer Technologies. 
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price and DCC - it shows posit ive relationship with the Venture industry index and the 
Barunson stock while moving opposite direction to the KOSDAQ index.  However, as 
the coefficients suggest, the movement of Littauer Technologies was not dependent on 
the market or the similar firm as much as the case of DCC.  This can also be found in 
the smaller adjusted R2 of Littauer Technologies.26  
In the process of compounding normal and abnormal returns of the company, one 
thing deserves to be highlighted – the treatment of special events during the event 
window.  Special events including rights offering for stock split or dividend payments 
could have a greater impact on the stock’s return than the effect of a manipulative action.  
On these days, normal returns of the stock of interest were set to be equal to the actual 
return. 27  Based on the assumption above, the normal return on September 14, 2000 
was set to be equal to the actual return of that day since Littauer Technologies executed 
a stock split. 
Through the accumulation process, I found that CARs were positive throughout the 
event window period with the exception of the last two days.  This implies that the 
                                                
26 The R2 of Littauer Technologies is only 0.1523 while the R2 of the previous two cases were 0.3~0.45. 
This implies the movement of the Littauer Technologies stock price is less related to the movement of the 
market. 
27 In case of rights offering for the third party (new shareholder), the reaction of the existing shareholders 
was not as significant as that toward other events. Littauer Technologies’ case had several offerings 
during the estimation and event windows period. However, the effect of those special events was too 
weak to have some meaning. Hence, I decided to ignore the effects and there was no need for the return to 
be adjusted. 
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effect of manipulation lasted for almost a year.  The student’s t-test showed that CARs 
were significantly different from zero during the period between February 2 and 
September 4, 2000.  The <figure Ⅴ> graphically shows the movement of CARs.  
<Figure Ⅵ> shows that the normal price level is always lower than the actual 
price level implying the existence of manipulation.  Based upon the test result in <table  
Ⅸ>, I can conclude that Littauer Technologies’ stock price was affected by 
manipulative power during the period between February 1 and September 5, 2000. 
However, in case of A&D stocks like Littauer Technologies, people may have 
difficulty in differentiating stock price hike reflecting the development efforts from the 
hike influenced by manipulation.  In the Littauer Technologies’ case, one might not 
easily distinguish them, either.  So, a need for comparison between ordinary 
movements of A&D stocks with that of Littauer Technologies arose. 
Since investors classify Littauer Technologies into Acquisition and Development 
(A&D) stock group, the large price change of Littauer Technologies might have been 
inevitable like most of other A&D stocks because A&D companies pour their effort to 
develop acquired firms.  Unfortunately, as of now, hardly anybody can suggest a 
precise distinction of those two price hikes.  So, as the second best policy, I surveyed 
the stock price movements and cumulative returns of PS Corporation (PS Technologies), 
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Mohenz Ltd, Dongteuk Corporation, IHIC Partners, ENPIA Corporation, Dongmi 
Industrial (Hostech Global) and Locus Holdings, which are thought to be A&D stocks.28  
The time period surveyed for those A&D stocks is one year or less from the first day of 
the month on which the firm experienced an acquisition. 29  According to the study, 
these firms of concern showed stock price increase within four months from the 
acquisitions.  In the Littauer Technologies case, the stock price at the time of 
acquisition was around 1,000 KRW per share and it went up to 4,350 KRW per share in 
a two-month period, and one can say it was the result of the development efforts.  
However, while other stocks began to be stabilized after the hike, the Littauer 
Technologies stock price, after a while, skyrocketed again.  The size of increase is also 
problematic.  The other A&D stocks showed less than 700 percent increase following 
these acquisitions as <figure Ⅶ> shows.  On the other hand, the stock price of 
Littauer Technologies jumped up around 40,000 percent from the stock price on June 1, 
1999.  Since, the company did not released an epochal invention but released several 
unexamined auspicious news that are under investigation, no reasonable person would 
regard the price hike as a ‘normal’ one, and this can be an evidence of stock price 
                                                
28 Among many classifications of A&D stocks, I chose those companies following the classification of 
Joongang Ilbo, a daily newspaper company in Korea, since the classification includes most of A&D 
stocks in securities market. 
29 The one-year period was studied to capture the eccentric price hike of the Littauer Technologies’ stock. 
Some companies’ acquisitions, however, were done in the second half of year 2000 except for Dongteuk 
Corporation and ENPIA Corporation, thus, not have been one year since the acquisitions.  
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manipulation. 
 
Ⅳ. Conclusion 
With so-called ‘venture boom’, the price change of securities in the KOSDAQ market 
has been more volatile than that of the KSE, since most of the companies registered in 
the KOSDAQ are venture companies with high level of technologies.  However, some 
portion of the volatility might be explained by active involvement of manipulators.  
According to the information asymmetry literature, large firms are less subject to the 
information asymmetry problem since investors heavily study them.  The KSE consists 
of those large firms so that the market’s self-surveillance by investors performs well.  
On the other hand, instability and low level of investors’ interest in small firms are 
giving more room for manipulators to exploit illegal profits.   Therefore, there is a 
need to study more and raise the level of surveillance system to frozen any future 
manipulation.  In addition, a need to shorten the time for investigation and prosecution 
should be stressed along with the strengthening the penalty.  A long investigation 
period contains the probability to give a distorted result and makes it hard to indemnify 
victims.30  Further investor education to prevent from being a victim of manipulation is 
                                                
30 Kim & Jang, 2000, An inquiry into the function and the role of stock price surveillance, Symposium in 
the Korean Securities Association: 243-266 
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also recommended. 
Investors recognize the shortage of surveillance power compare to the increasing 
number of illegal securities transaction.  However, in order to fight against clever 
manipulators, the supervisory body would have to come up with a smarter tool which 
can detect the crimes red-handed.31  Furthermore, device for evaluation of A&D stocks 
is required.  Without it, no one can guarantee there would not be a recurrence of 
manipulation in those stocks. 
This paper has some limitations.  Since the nature of event study is quite 
subjective in selecting the windows and the variable to be included in the model, there 
would sure be people who would raise doubts on the results.  Shortage of enough 
trading data in some cases also decreases the significance of the findings.  And, 
evaluation of A&D stock is problematic too.  People might also raise questions on the 
mere comparison of stock price movement during the period following acquisitions.  
Those limitations would be relieved in further studies.
                                                
31 Researches such as Park & Lee (2000), How to detect dummy orders?, Symposium in the Korean 
Securities Association:163-190, try to suggest more efficient tools which can detect manipulative 
attempts in the vast amount of trading orders with relatively few human resources. 
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Table II 
Ratio of Cyber Trade (based on Trade Value) 
 
 1998 1999 2000. 6 
Total Trade Value (billion) 43,989 133,969 138,937 
Cyber Trade Value (billion) 1,634 53,882 82,015 
Ratio 3.7 % 40.2 % 59.0 % 
                                        Source: Korea Stock Exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I 
Trends in Daily Trading Volume, Stock Price Manipulation  
and Insider Trading 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000. 7 
Daily Trading 
Volume (tril) 
487 
558 
(14.1%) 
660 
(18.8%) 
3482 
(427.8%) 
3066 
Stock Price 
Manipulation 
37 34 21 77 38 
Insider  
Trading 
18 35 72 71 33 
Total 55  
69 
(25.4%) 
93 
(34.8%) 
148 
(59.1%) 
71 
* Figures in the parentheses are year-to-year changes  
Source: Korea Stock Exchange 
Table III 
Ratio of Day Trade 
 
 1999. 7 1999. 12 2000. 7 
In Trade Volume 20.43% 27.42% 46.25% 
In Trade Value 17.89% 23.71% 33.23% 
                                        Source: Korea Stock Exchange 
 38 
Table Ⅳ 
Regression models for Willbes 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
0.0084 
(0.0055) 
0.0105** 
(0.0052) 
0.0088 
(0.0055) 
0.0087 
(0.0055) 
KOSPI 
0.6652*** 
(0.1592) 
   
Mid-size 
Firms 
 
0.8724*** 
(0.1497) 
  
Whole Sellers   
0.6252*** 
(0.1428) 
 
Shinsung    
0.2809*** 
(0.0987) 
Adj. R2 0.1163 0.2086 0.1269 0.0537 
Observations 126 126 126 126 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 
0.0133*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0087 
(0.0055) 
0.0086 
(0.0055) 
0.0115** 
(0.0052) 
KOSPI 
-1.5164*** 
(0.4394) 
0.1730 
(0.4129) 
0.6013*** 
(0.2002) 
 
Mid-size 
Firms 
2.2953*** 
(0.4366) 
  
1.6220*** 
(0.3874) 
Whole Sellers  
0.4811 
(0.3725) 
 
-0.7363** 
(0.3517) 
Shinsung   
0.0635 
(0.1200) 
 
Adj. R2 0.2726 0.1211 0.1112 0.2296 
Observations 126 126 126 126 
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Continued: 
 
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors.  
*, **, *** imply the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Intercept 
0.0104** 
(0.0052) 
0.0088 
(0.0055) 
0.0135*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0136*** 
(0.0050) 
KOSPI   
-1.3543*** 
(0.4797) 
-1.7495*** 
(0.4441) 
Mid-size 
Firms 
1.0642*** 
(0.2080) 
 
2.4648*** 
(0.4808) 
2.8341*** 
(0.4905) 
Whole Sellers  
0.6132*** 
(0.1908) 
-0.3159 
(0.3732) 
 
Shinsung 
-0.1661 
(0.1254) 
0.1730 
(0.4129) 
 
-0.2771** 
(0.1219) 
Adj. R2 0.2134 0.1211 0.2709 0.2964 
Observations 126 126 126 126 
 Model 13 Model 14   
Intercept 
0.0114** 
(0.0052) 
0.0137*** 
(0.0050) 
  
KOSPI  
-1.6488*** 
(0.4922) 
  
Mid-size 
Firms 
1.7708*** 
(0.4054) 
2.2911*** 
(0.5172) 
  
Whole Sellers 
-0.711** 
(0.3517) 
-0.1797 
(0.3732) 
  
Shinsung 
-0.1513 
(0.1241) 
-0.2700** 
(0.1241) 
  
Adj. R2 0.2327 0.2920   
Observations 126 126   
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Table Ⅴ 
t-value of Willbes 
 
Date t-value 
98 / 0 2 / 1 1 -5. 4 4 98 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 1 2 1 2.1720 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 1 3 1 6.12 4 1 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 1 4 2 2.256 4 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 1 6 28.2879 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 1 7 2 3.79 95 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 18 2 2.9 1 02 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 1 9 2 0.8478 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 2 0 2 2.36 30 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 2 1 2 3.2628 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 2 3 1 9.82 48 * 
9 8 / 0 2/ 2 4 1 9.850 4 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 2 5 2 1.9668 * 
 
Test statistics is t(124; 0.025) = 1.96, and the figures with star-mark (*) are greater than 
the test statistics implying their significance under five percent significance level. 
With the implication, I can conclude that the CAR from February 11 to March 6, 
1998 is significant and the stock is affected by manipulation. 
Date t-value 
98 / 0 2 / 2 6 2 0.1 3 28 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 2 7 1 4.9 3 9 4 * 
9 8 / 0 2 / 28 1 0.6 1 4 5 * 
9 8 / 0 3 / 0 2 7.0760 * 
9 8 / 0 3 / 0 3 1 0.072 1 * 
9 8 / 0 3 / 0 4 1 0.705 1 * 
9 8 / 0 3 / 0 5 5.775 9 * 
9 8 / 0 3 / 0 6 3. 4656 * 
9 8 / 0 3 / 0 7 1.9 1 58 
9 8 / 0 3 / 0 9 0. 4 2 3 0 
9 8 / 0 3 / 1 0 -1. 1208 
9 8 / 0 3 / 1 1 -0.2 1 9 2 
9 8 / 0 3 / 1 2 -0.6 10 3 
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Table Ⅵ 
Regression models for DCC 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
0.0036 
(0.0076) 
-0.0040 
(0.0072) 
0.0051 
(0.0066) 
-0.0063 
(0.0075) 
KOSDAQ 
Index 
1.0734*** 
(0.2731) 
  
-0.5378 
(0.5160) 
Venture 
Index 
 
0.9676*** 
(0.1764) 
 
1.2998*** 
(0.3643) 
Futures 
Cable TV 
  
0.5827*** 
(0.0941) 
 
Adj. R2 0.1915 0.3228 0.3795 0.3238 
Observations 62 62 62 62 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  
Intercept 
0.0048 
(0.0067) 
0.0003 
(0.0068) 
-0.0032 
(0.0068) 
 
KOSDAQ 
Index 
0.1553 
(0.3230) 
 
-0.5378** 
(0.5160) 
 
Venture 
Index 
 
0.4928** 
(0.2171) 
1.0313*** 
(0.3360) 
 
Futures 
Cable TV 
0.5420*** 
(0.1271) 
0.4017*** 
(0.1211) 
0.4637*** 
(0.1216) 
 
Adj. R2 0.3715 0.4196 0.4500  
Observations 62 62 62  
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors.  
*, **, *** imply the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. 
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Table Ⅶ 
CAR and t-value of DCC 
Date 1999/11/30 1999/12/01 1999/12/02 1999/12/03 1999/12/06 
CAR 0.0718 0.1869 -0.0536 -0.1137 -0.1275 
t-test 1.4088 2.5677* -14.4810* -6.2481* -4.5522* 
 
Date 1999/12/07 1999/12/08 1999/12/09 1999/12/10 1999/12/13 
CAR -0.1506 -0.0847 -0.1557 -0.1948 -0.1486 
t-test -3.2673* -1.2412 -1.4839 -1.2852 -0.6644 
 
The CAR of both November 30th and December 1st were showing positive signs 
suggesting the impact of the recommendation. From December 2nd, it turned into 
negative as a result of the extensive selling orders of the organizational investor. 
Test statistics is t(60;0.025) = 2.00, and the t-value figures with star mark (*)are greater 
than the test statistics implying their significance under five percent significance level. 
With the implication, I can conclude that the CAR from December 1 to December 7, 
1999 the DCC stock price was affected by the two manipulations. 
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Table Ⅷ 
Regression models for Littauer Technologies 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
0.0026 
(0.0072) 
0.0011 
(0.0071) 
0.0049 
(0.0067) 
-0.0005 
(0.0072) 
KOSDAQ 
Index 
0.3362 
(0.2242) 
  
-0.6606 
(0.5149) 
Venture 
Index 
 
0.3678** 
(0.1608) 
 
0.8008** 
(0.3737) 
Barunson   
0.3757*** 
(0.0824) 
 
Adj. R2 0.0102 0.0338 0.1404 0.3238 
Observations 122 122 122 122 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  
Intercept 
0.0048 
(0.0067) 
0.0038 
(0.0067) 
0.0022 
(0.0068) 
 
KOSDAQ 
Index 
0.1542 
(0.2136) 
 
-0.6180 
(0.4837) 
 
Venture 
Index 
 
0.2215 
(0.1551) 
0.6276* 
(0.3535) 
 
Futures 
Cable TV 
0.3637*** 
(0.0843) 
0.3482*** 
(0.0843) 
0.3459*** 
(0.0841) 
 
Adj. R2 0.1370 0.1478 0.1523  
Observations 122 122 122  
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors.  
*, **, *** imply the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. 
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Table Ⅸ 
t-value of Littauer Technologies 
 
Date t-value  Date t-value  Date t-value 
00/01/27 1. 32 98  00/03/08 31.9662 *  00/04/18 38.4829 * 
00/01/28 1.6595  00/03/09 33.8494 *  00/04/19 36.1548 * 
00/01/31 1.8406  00/03/10 36.0944 *  00/04/20 30.4435 * 
00/02/01 1.9 95 3 *  00/03/13 38.2744 *  00/04/21 31.6736 * 
00/02/02 2.7 158 *  00/03/1 4 43.6599 *  00/04/24 36.5247 * 
00/02/03 2.9627 * *  00/03/15 49.9312 *  00/04/25 41.0700 * 
00/02/07 3.7 4 50 *  00/03/16 5 7.8355*  00/04/26 43.5686 * 
00/02/08 4.7 377 *  00/03/17 66.1496 *  00/04/27 42.9819 * 
00/02/09 5.6752 *  00/03/20 55.4520 *  00/04/28 41.3531 * 
00/02/10 6.6 1 3 5 *  00/03/21 44.8064 *  00/05/02 45.6902 * 
00/02/11 7.2988 *  00/03/22 49.5678 *  00/05/03 49.6480 * 
0 0/02/14 8.035 1 *  00/03/23 52.5944 *  00/05/04 55.7022 * 
00/02/15 9. 46 9 9 *  00/03/24 43.2827 *  00/05/08 48.9028 * 
00/02/16 10.1341 *  00/03/27 43.1966 *  00/05/09 52.0497 * 
00/02/17 10.9420 *  00/03/28 45.8009 *  00/05/10 56.9046 * 
00/02/18 11.8449 *  00/03/29 49.8707 *  00/05/12 63.6982 * 
00/02/21 12.2660 *  00/03/30 52.9167 *  00/05/15 71.1417 * 
00/02/22 13.2784 *  00/03/31 57.1204 *  00/05/16 80.6683 * 
00/02/23 14.2258 *  00/04/03 61.6581 *  00/05/17 90.1157 * 
00/02/24 14.5999 *  00/04/04 71.3159 *  00/05/18 78.4590 * 
0 0 / 0 2/25 15.9841 *  00/04/06 68.4796 *  00/05/19 68.9891 * 
00/02/28 17.8628 *  00/04/07 69.6745 *  00/05/22 60.3597 * 
00/02/29 18.7275 *  00/04/10 68.7176 *  00/05/23 62.5692 * 
00/03/02 20.0661 *  00/04/11 56.5956 *  00/05/24 56.5150 * 
00/03/03 22.4062 *  00/04/12 60.4605*   00/05/25 60.3786 * 
00/03/06 25.8864 *  00/04/1 4 56.6998 *  00/05/26 54.0334 * 
00/03/07 28.4267 *  00/04/17 46.6562 *  00/05/29 47.2493 * 
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Continued: 
Date t-value  Date t-value  Date t-value 
00/05/30 43.7981 *  00/07/07 19.5476 *  00/08/17 3.9005 * 
00/05/31 48.5035 *  00/07/10 17.9967 *  00/08/18 3.5 102 * 
00/06/01 45.0386 *  00/07/11 17.5032 *  00/08/21 3.8259 * 
00/06/02 42.4304 *  00/07/12 16.2786 *  00/08/22 3.5789 * 
00/06/05 46.5883 *  00/07/13 14.1505 *  00/08/23 3.0 977 * 
00/06/07 51.4176 *  00/07/14 13.7237 *  0 0 / 08/24 3.0800 * 
00/06/08 45.7808 *  00/07/18 12.1324 *  00/08/25 2.75 4 1 * 
00/06/09 44.2104 *  00/07/19 10.1350 *  00/08/28 2.8166 * 
00/06/12 43.3187 *  00/07/20 8.29 1 3 *  00/08/29 3.2853 * 
00/06/13 41.5248 *  00/07/21 8.0686 *  00/08/30 2.9 46 3 * 
00/06/14 40.2662 *  00/07/24 8.7502 *  00/08/31 2.6 4 3 2 * 
00/06/15 35.8331 *  00/07/25 9. 47 35 *  00/09/01 2. 4 2 3 4 * 
00/06/16 33.7842 *  00/07/26 8.4 3 3 7 *  00/09/04 2.0 172 * 
00/06/19 37.4490 *  00/07/27 8.27 15 *  00/09/05 2. 15 48 * 
00/06/20 41.5304 *  00/07/28 7.150 4 *  00/09/06 1.92 36 
00/06/21 46.6934 *  00/07/31 7.3 4 3 9 *  00/09/07 1.6952 
00/06/22 38.3657 *  00/08/01 8.5097 *  00/09/08 1.92 18 
00/06/23 40.9671 *  00/08/02 8.2 4 28 *  00/09/1 4 1. 9 1 52 
00/06/26 36.9584 *  00/08/03 8.779 3 *  00/09/15 1.772 9 
00/06/27 34.1010 *  00/08/04 8.4 957 *  0 0 / 0 9/18 1. 4756 
00/06/28 31.1355 *  00/08/07 8.1 96 1 *  00/09/19 1. 30 3 9 
00/06/29 30.2821 *  00/08/08 7. 4 9 9 3 *  00/09/20 1. 3202 
00/06/30 26.1484 *  00/08/09 7.0684 *  00/09/21 1. 1 4 1 4 
00/07/03 24.8234 *  00/08/10 6.22 1 3 *  00/09/22 0.9 1 98 
00/07/04 26.6433 *  00/08/11 5.3 4 38 *  00/09/25 1.022 1 
00/07/05 23.2786 *  00/08/14 4. 4 57 1 *  00/09/26 0.9289 
00/07/06 20.4202 *  00/08/16 4.845 4 *  00/09/27 1.0861 
 
Test statistics is t(120;0.025) = 1.98, and the t-value figures with star mark (*)are greater 
than the test statistics implying their significance under five percent significance level. 
With the implication, I can conclude that the CAR from February 1 to September 5, 
2000, the DCC stock price was affected by manipulation. 
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Figure Ⅰ 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Movements of Willbes 
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Figure Ⅱ 
Movements of Normal and Actual Price of Willbes 
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Figure Ⅲ 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Movements of DCC 
-0.30
-0.15
0.00
0.15
0.30
99-11-30 99-12-03 99-12-06 99-12-09 99-12-12
 
 
Figure Ⅳ 
Movements of Normal and Actual Price of DCC 
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Figure Ⅴ 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Movements of Littauer Technologies 
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Figure Ⅵ 
Movements of Normal and Actual Price of Littauer Technologies 
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Figure Ⅶ 
Price Hikes of A&D Stocks 
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* The company names are abbreviated as follows: PS(PS Corporation), DT(Dongteuk 
Corporation), MZ(Mohenz Ltd.), LC(Locus Holdings), HT(Hostech Global), 
EP(ENPIA Corporation), IH(IHIC Partners), LT(Littauer Technologies). 
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